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FIFTY YEARS OF THE BASIC LAW-
MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND ASYLUM
Dr. Kay Hailbronner*
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
ERMANY has one of the largest immigration populations in the
world. In 1998, approximately 7.32 million foreigners were living
in Germany, making up approximately nine percent of the total
population.' Compared to other European countries, Germany ranks
fourth after Luxembourg, Switzerland, and Belgium.2 The number of for-
eigners has increased from 686,000 in 1960 to 7.32 million in 1998, which
is an average yearly increase of 200,000 to 300,000 people. Most foreign-
ers come from Turkey (28.8 percent), the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(9.8 percent), Italy (8.4 percent), Greece (5 percent), Poland (3.9 per-
cent), Croatia (2.9 percent), Bosnia (2.6 percent), and Austria (2.5 per-
cent). Only 25.1 percent of all foreigners living in the Federal Republic of
Germany were EU citizens. The percentage of foreigners from former
Yugoslavia has been constantly rising and achieving a new peak with the
large number of Kosovo-Albanians taking up a permanent residence in
Germany immediately before or during the recent military conflict.
In 1997, about 30 percent of all foreigners had already lived in Ger-
many for twenty years or longer, 40 percent for more than fifteen years,
and almost 50 percent for more than ten years. Today, almost two thirds
of all foreign children born to immigrants were born in Germany and will
spend most of their youth there. Statistically, they are registered as for-
eigners even although they may well be third generation Germans.
Naturalizations have never been prevalent, however, due to some ef-
forts to facilitate the naturalization procedures, they have substantially
increased. The rate of naturalizations in Germany has increased from 0.3
percent to 1.2 percent since 1996, which means that 1.2 percent of the
foreign population acquired citizenship. Asylum seekers account for a
large part of the immigration into Germany. In 1992, at the peak of the
asylum seeker movement, Germany, with 438,000 asylum seekers, admit-
* Law School, University of Konstanz, Germany; LL.M., Montreal, Canada.
1. See Beauftragte der Bundesregierung fiir Ausldnderfragen, 18 DATEN UND FAKTEN
ZUR AUSLANDERSITUATION 7 (1999). See annex thereto for a discussion of the share of
foreigners in the population of the European Union (EU).
2. For the statistical survey, see Mitteilungen der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung
fir Auslainderfragen, DATEN UND FAKTEN ZUR AUSLANDERSITUATION (1998); B ZAHLEN,
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DES INNERN, AUSLANDER IN DEUTSCHLAND, Statistiken, Fakten
(1997).
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ted the majority of all asylum seekers coming to the EU. Although Ger-
many has reformed its law, it is still one of the primary destinations of
asylum seekers. In 1998, 98,700 asylum seekers were registered in Ger-
many, compared to 21,800 in France, 4,700 in Italy, and 57,700 in Great
Britain.
The fathers of the Basic Law could hardly foresee such a development.
Nobody could have imagined such a large immigration into a country de-
stroyed by the war and deeply shattered by its recent history. No one
could have predicted that Germany, with its record of human rights viola-
tions and genocide, would become a major European country of immigra-
tion. And yet, it was precisely this history of totalitarianism, war,
separation and the expulsion of large parts of the German population
from Eastern Europe that prompted the constitutional rules for migra-
tion, asylum, and citizenship. Anybody who was persecuted on political
grounds was granted a right of asylum. Unlike many other basic rights,
the right of asylum was granted without any limitation or statutory reser-
vation. The freedom of movement of all Germans, including those
Germans living outside the Federal Republic, became the constitutional
basis for German nationals and persons suffering expulsion due to their
German ethnic origin. This freedom, however, was not granted without
limits. The fathers of the Constitution were aware of the danger of a
large, uncontrolled migration. Therefore, freedom of movement was
granted, but granted subject various to restrictions, so as not to cause
financial burdens on the community from such migration.
With respect to the migration of foreigners, the Basic Law of the newly
founded republic made no explicit provisions. Therefore, admission and
residence of aliens remained within the prerogative of the legislature and
the executive. This does not mean that the Basic Law is completely silent
on issues of migration and the rights of aliens. Basic human rights and
institutional guarantees, similar to the provisions under which special
state protection is given to marriage and family, quickly became an im-
portant constitutional guideline for issues of family reunion and expul-
sion. As a rule, however, the Basic Law reserved some important
constitutional rights to Germans. These rights include: the freedom of
movement, the right to choose occupation and profession, and the right
to assemble peacefully and to form associations. Foreigners were not in-
cluded in such constitutional guaranties. However, with the development
of Germany into a de facto immigration country, constitutional attempts
have been made that provide long-term residents with the same constitu-
tional rights afforded German citizens.
Citizenship remains a major concern of the Basic Law since German
nationality law had been one of the major instruments of totalitarian rule
used to dispel ethnically and racially unwanted Germans. On the other
hand, the law had to make provision for the large number of Germans
living outside the Federal Republic. German nationality thus became an
indispensable element of German unity beyond the territorial division.
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II. MIGRATION
The Basic Law had very little reason to be particularly concerned about
foreigners, primarily because there were so few in Germany. Further,
refugees were almost immediately admitted to German citizenship, due
to their ethnic, cultural, or linguistic affiliation to Germany. This affilia-
tion, in terms of an ethno/cultural community, allowed such refugees to
be treated as part of the German "nation. ''3 By reserving some constitu-
tional rights, the Basic Law has opted for a distinction between general
human rights granted to anybody and constitutional rights reserved to
citizens. In accordance with traditional theory, migration and the legal
status of aliens, with exception of political asylum, were left to the discre-
tion of the legislature.
The distinction between human rights and constitutional rights re-
served to Germans has, however, never played a significant role in pro-
moting a restrictive policy for two reasons. First, there has never been a
serious constitutional attempt to limit Parliament's ability to grant equal
or similar statutory rights to resident aliens. With the recruitment of for-
eign labor and the gradual, although not planned, development of Ger-
many into a "de facto" immigration country, social rights of aliens, equal
treatment in social insurance, as well as a right to assemble and to form
associations were extended to foreigners without any major political
problems. The Constitutional Court interpreted Article 2 of the Basic
Law, as giving everyone a right to self-fulfillment via a subsidiary human
rights clause. This permitted aliens seeking to challenge statutory or ad-
ministrative restrictions of their legal rights to have access to the Consti-
tutional Court.4
Second, the Basic Law is open to international laws as reflected in its
Article 25, which grants priority status for the general rules of public in-
ternational laws as well as outlines its commitment to international trea-
ties. Overtime, this openness has become a substantial factor in
establishing a constitutional framework for determining migration issues. 5
The implications of public international law are by no means free of
conflicts. There have been and are still divergent opinions on the inter-
pretation of international treaties, which are relevant to migration issues.
A recent example of this are the various interpretations of the term "in-
human treatment," which is contained in Article 3 of the European Con-
3. See GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] [GG] art. 116(1), which states: Deutscher im
Sinne dieses Grundgesetzes ist vorbehaltlich anderweitiger gesetzlicher Regelung, wer die
deutsche Staatsangeh6rigkeit besitzt oder als FlUchtling oder Vertriebener deutscher Volk-
szugeh6rigkeit oder als dessen Ehegatte oder Abk6mmling in dem Gebiete des Deutschen
Reiches nach dem Stande vom 31. Dezember 1937 Aufnahme gefunden hat; cf. KAY HAIL-
BRONNER ET AL., STAATSANGEHORIGKEITSRECHT: KOMMENTAR, art. 116, no. 5 (2d ed.
1998) [hereinafter HAILBRONNER, STAATSANGEHORIGKEITSRECHT].
4. See BVerfGE 35, 382 (399); BVerfGE 49, 168; BVerfGE 78, 179 (196); cf
MICHAEL SACHS, GRUNDGESETZ: KOMMENTAR 139 (1996).
5. For the minimum standard of protection of aliens, see BVerfGE 59, 280 (283);
BVerfGE 63, 332 (338); BVerfGE 60, 253 (303); BVerfGE 67, 43 (63).
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vention on Human Rights. 6 On the whole, however, international legal
norms, as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (in mat-
ters of protection of the family or of aliens facing torture or inhuman
treatment), were incorporated into German legal theory and practice.
Although, under the Basic Law, international treaties do not have the
rank of constitutional law, the Constitutional Court has constantly ap-
plied a doctrine of presumption in favor of compliance with the interna-
tional law obligations of the Federal Republic. 7
Finally, the European integration, based upon Article 23 of the Basic
Law, had, by far, the largest impact on migration and asylum issues. This
was true not only with the establishment of the freedom of movement for
union citizens and their relatives, but also with the transfer of sovereignty
in almost all matters of immigration and asylum. The Amsterdam Treaty
has irrevocably put an end to the national immigration and asylum pol-
icy. 8 We do not yet know what a European immigration policy will even-
tually be like in five or ten years time. The Amsterdam Treaty has only
now just become effective, and it will require tremendous efforts to im-
plement, due to the unanimity requirement and the five-year term of the
member states. It is evident that, even at the present state, when there is
still a German migration policy, European implications are predominant
for any major political decision in migration and asylum issues. This will
also affect, if not determine, the Basic Law parameters for migration and
asylum law.
III. GERMAN MIGRATION LAW AND POLICY
If we take a closer look at the German migration policy, we will find a
similar pattern of development toward a more or less unwanted immigra-
tion. This is due to guest-worker recruitment, subsequent family reunifi-
cation, and somewhat uncontrolled, economically-driven, mass migration
movements.9 One could forever speculate whether it would have been
possible and morally acceptable to maintain a rotation system, as origi-
nally planned. However, with the admission of large numbers of re-
cruited workers, and subsequently, their family members, immigration
did occur though every German government has insisted that Germany is
not an immigration country. These governments seem to be saying
merely that Germany's migration policy is not directed toward immigra-
tion. Germany, a "reluctant land of immigration," as Philip Martin has
6. For the jurisprudence of the Federal Administrative Court (FAC) decision of April
15, 1997, see NVWZ: Neue Zeitschrift fur Verwaltungsrecht, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHEN-
SCHRIFr 1127 (1997). For the controversy between the European Court of Human Rights
and the Federal Administrative Court, see KAY HAILBRONNER, DIE OFFENTLICHE
VERWALT'UNG 617, 620 (1999) .
7. See BVerfGE 6, 309 (362); BVerfGE 41, 88 (120).
8. For a survey, see Kay Hailbronner, Emigration and Immigration Law, 1 EURO-
PEAN J. OF MIGRATION AND) L. (1999), 68 NOR1IC J. OF INT'L L. (1999).
9. See Philip Martin, Germany: Reluctant Land of Immigration, GERM. J., AM. INST.
FOR CONTEMPORARY GERM. STUDIES (1998).
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called it,1° had difficulties legally coping with large numbers of migrant
workers who had remained in Germany for so long that Germany could
properly be described as their homeland, even though the vast majority
of them remained foreign citizens.
The Aliens Law of 1965 was .still very much preoccupied with the legal
status of aliens under the aspect of protection of public order and secur-
ity. Rights of aliens and immigration were more or less disregarded,
while the unique situation of permanent residents and their family mem-
bers was not even recognized."1 Aliens were considered temporary visi-
tors and were permitted to remain in the country so long as neither
market needs nor the general interest to prevent immigration outweighed
this allowance.
However, with the Aliens Law of 1990,12 different categories of aliens,
such as temporary visitors, students and seasonal workers, permanent re-
sidents, family members, and humanitarian refugees receiving temporary
protection. Although the law still did not provide for an immigrant status
it indirectly acknowledged an immigrant status by providing for individ-
ual rights to obtain a permanent resident status and by substantially re-
ducing administrative discretion to terminate the residence of long term
aliens or those who had been born or brought up in Germany.
The Constitutional Court has played a significant role in the develop-
ment of a diversified pattern of residence rights, primarily by using the
Basic Law's protection clauses in favor of marriage and family and by
using general constitutional principles of proportionality. In 1987, the
Court dealt with residence permits, which required a spouse to wait three
years before being allowed to receive one. 13 The Court argued that, al-
though Article 6 of the Basic Law, which protects marriage, did not es-
tablish an individual rights of family reunification for foreign spouses or
children in the Federal Republic of Germany, the courts and alien au-
thorities were obliged to properly consider the protection of marriage
and family in every decision on family reunification. Therefore, the
three-year waiting period requirement, enacted to check the growing
family reunification, was considered unconstitutional. The Court, how-
ever, did not challenge a one-year waiting period in order to prevent
sham marriages, nor did it challenge the requirement that family reunifi-
cation is only possible if a foreigner has already spent a period of eight
years in Germany. 14 The Court explicitly rejected any quota regulations
with regard to family reunification. It argued that treatment of family
10. See id.
11. For a survey of the historical development, see GONTER RENNER, AUSLANDER-
RECHT IN DEUTSCHLAND: EINREISE UND AUFENTHALT 27 (1998) [hereinafter RENNER
AUSLAND].
12. See generally GONTER RENNER, AUSLANDERRECHT IN DEUTSCHLAND: KOM-
MENTAR (7th ed. 1999) [hereinafter RENNER KOMMENTAR]; KAY HAILBRONNER, Aus-
LANDERRECHT: KOMMENTAR (20th Supp. Aug. 1999).
13. See generally BverfGE 76, 1.
14. See id. at 65.
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members, according to a "waiting-in-line principle," would hardly be
compatible with the constitutional protection of marriage and family
under Article 6 of the Basic Law, since such a principle would not allow
for sufficient consideration of the individual circumstances of every
case. 15 This decision has been the basis of numerous court decisions on
the implications of Article 6 of the Basic Law regarding questions of en-
try, residence, and expulsion. 16
The protection granted, under constitutional principles, has been grad-
ually extended to any kind of family relationship, including adopted mi-
nor children or the right of a father to maintain a family relationship with
his illegitimate child. 17 Although the Court has always insisted that mar-
riage or family does not grant an unlimited right of residence or of family
reunification, the constitutional requirement to draw a proper balance
between private and public interests substantially contributed to reducing
the traditional concept of a state's sovereign right to decide on the entry
and residence of foreigners. Eventually, the new Aliens Law of 1990
granted the right of family reunification without any waiting period but
still subject to certain conditions. In general, the requirements for the
subsequent immigration of dependents are: (1) that a foreigner who has
been living in Germany maintain a residence permit or a right of unlim-
ited residence; (2) that there be sufficient living space for the family; and
(3) that the maintenance of the dependents be secured from the gainful
employment of the foreigner, their assets, or other means of their own.
Spouses of first generation foreigners, who held rights of unlimited res-
idence, and who had been living in Germany, and who held residence
permits when the new Act came into effect, will be granted a residence
permit, provided the marriage already existed and was confirmed at the
time they came to Germany.18 Foreigners of the second and following
generations (i.e., those born or raised in Germany) may also bring their
spouses to Germany, provided they have an unlimited residence permit
or a right of unlimited residence, have lived in Germany for eight years,
and are of age. While typically foreigners had no legal rights to come to
Germany, in order to join their foreign spouse, they may now be admit-
ted at the discretion of the competent authorities. This, however, is con-
ditioned upon the spouse having a residence permit or a residence title
for specific purposes and that the general requirements for the immigra-
tion of dependents (such as providing for sufficient living space and inde-
pendent means of support) are fulfilled.' 9 Foreigners may be admitted, in
order to join a family member who holds a residence title granted for
exceptional reasons, only on urgent humanitarian grounds.
15. See id. at 65-66.
16. See RENNER AUSLAND at 438; GOBEL-ZIMMERMANN, ZEITSCHRIF'T FOR Aus-
LANDERRECHT UND AUSLANDERPOLITIK 170 (1995).
17. See BVerfGE 80, 81; HANS D. JARASS & Boro PIEROTH, GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE
BUNDESREPUI3LIK DEUTSCHLAND: KAMMENTAR (2d ed. 1992).
18. See § 18 para. 1, no. 3.
19. See § 18 para. 2.
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Until they reach the age of sixteen, unmarried children from non-EU
states are legally entitled to immigrate, in order to join their parents liv-
ing in Germany. This requires that both parents lawfully reside in Ger-
many. 20 However, on urgent humanitarian grounds, children may be
permitted to immigrate subsequently in order to join parents holding an
exceptional residence title. In special cases, unmarried children may im-
migrate subsequently until they attain age eighteen or come to Germany
to live with a single parent.21
A major issue of concern with respect to the German migration policy
has been the rights of spouses after a divorce or separation. Originally,
spouses lost their right of residence in this situation. The new Aliens Law
of 1990 provided for an independent residence right for spouses, regard-
less of separation or divorce, if the marriage lasted for at least four years
or if the husband died during the marriage. A hardship clause has been
introduced in cases where it would be unacceptable to terminate the resi-
dence of a husband. This provision is continuously challenged by human
rights advocates, who argue that women, in particular, are risking a loss
of residence right if a divorce occurs.
The Federal Administrative Court was recently faced with the issue of
whether unmarried and homosexual couples should receive the same con-
stitutional protection as is granted to married couples. The Federal Ad-
ministrative Court decided that while quasi-marriages cannot be brought
under the constitutional protection of marriage, they still may enjoy the
constitutional protection given to families.22 The exact implications of
this decision are yet to be examined. The European Parliament, as well
as the European Commission's proposals on a European Union Policy on
migration, have suggested the inclusion of unmarried couples into the
scope of family reunion for EU citizens when the host member state rec-
ognizes the legal status of unmarried couples for its own nationals.2 3 The
question arises whether equal treatment would substantially raise the
number of foreigners arguing for a right of family reunification. In order
to enjoy equal treatment, a formal registry procedure appears to be an
indispensable requirement for a privileged residence right.
General constitutional principles on proportionality24 have frequently
been used by the Constitutional Court to curtail the administrative power
to refuse a renewal of a residence right or expel a foreigner for reasons of
public order. In 1979, the Federal Administrative Court had already
pointed out that a foreigner after many years of lawful residence could
20. See § 20 para. 2.
21. See § 20 para. 3-5.
22. See BVerfGE 100, 287; see also ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL COURT OF HESSEN,
NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR VERWALTUNGSRECHT 55 (1994); WEGNER, DIE NICHTEHELICHE
LEBENSGEMEINSCHAFT IM DEUTSCHEN AUSLANDERRECHT 106 (1998).
23. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Par-
liament of July 1, 1998, COM(98)403 final, at 9; Proposal for a Council Regulation of July
22, 1998, COM(98)394 final, at 12.
24. See generally BVerfGE 35, 382; BVerfGE 49, 168; BVerfGE 50, 166; BVerfGE 51,
386; see also RENNER, AUSLANDERRECHT, at 603.
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not be expelled for minor offences. There must be serious reasons to
deprive a foreigner of his economic and social existence established in
Germany.2 5 A large jurisprudence dealing with the issue of balancing the
legitimate interests of foreigners with public order has deeply influenced
the new provisions on expulsion in the Aliens Law of 1990. The general
power to expel a foreigner for public order violations has been substan-
tially restricted in cases where foreigners enjoy a secure residence status
or an unlimited residence permit. The law now provides for a compli-
cated system of protection for foreigners who were born in Germany or
who immigrated as children of migrant workers. Generally speaking,
only serious offenses may justify expulsion.2 6 The Parliament, however,
has not yet followed a recommendation put forward by the European
Parliament and supported by a minority of the judges of the European
Court of Human Rights,27 whereby foreigners, born or brought up in the
host country, enjoy absolute protection against expulsion. Even in cases
involving very serious criminal offenses, the European Court of Human
Rights has seriously restricted the right of contracting states to expel for-
eigners who have lost their ties with their home country.2 8
The jurisprudence of the Federal Administrative Court and Constitu-
tional Court, however, did not fundamentally challenge the Basic Law's
distinction between the basic rights of Germans and the human rights
granted to everyone. Despite this, numerous attempts have been made to
argue that the Basic Law could not possibly have foreseen the develop-
ment of Germany into a "de-facto" immigration country. And that,
therefore, the constitutional distinction between foreigners and Germans
has become obsolete. 29 The Constitutional Court has never taken up this
line of argument. A somewhat more moderate approach promotes a
gradual constitutional assimilation of foreigners with immigrants eventu-
ally obtaining equal constitutional rights. Article 3 of the Basic Law,
which grants equality before the law, was used to argue in favor of a con-
stitutional recognition that Germany had become a country of immigra-
tion and that its immigrants should receive equal social and, at least on
the regional level, political rights. The predominant constitutional the-
ory, however, has insisted that in spite of Germany's development into a
de-facto immigration country, there was no obligation to provide for a
25. See BVerfGE 59, 112 (114); see also HAILBRONNER, AUSLANDERRECHT, at 362.
26. See generally sections 47 and 48 of the Aliens Law.
27. See generally Beljoudi v. France, 234 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992).
28. See generally Moustaquim v. Belgium, 193 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991); Berrehab
v. Netherlands, 138 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988). For a comparative study of law and
practice in European countries, see GROENENDIJK ET AL., SECURITY OF LONG-TERM RE-
SIDENTS (1998).
29. For a comprehensive discussion of the constitutional rights of aliens, see Karl
Doehring & Josef Isensee, Die staatsrechtliche Stellung der Auslander in der Bundesrepub-
lik Deutschland, 32 VEROFFENTLICHUNG DER VEREINIGUNG DEUTSCHER STAATSRECHT-
SLEHRER 7, 50 (1974); Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhoff, Handbuch des Staatsrechts der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 664 (1992); C. Tietze, Constitutionalism, Universalism and De-
mocracy-a comparative analysis, in LAW AND MEDICINE IN GERMANY 199 (1999).
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constitutional rights assimilation of foreigners.30 It was rightly argued
that the Constitution did not prohibit the granting of equal rights, but the
factual situation of foreigners did not, as a matter of "superior constitu-
tional principles," imply a "constitutional rights assimilation."
The Constitutional Court, in a landmark decision of October 31, 1990,
which involved the granting of political rights on the communal level to
foreigners in Hamburg, struck down the Hamburg law as unconstitu-
tional. The Hamburg Law provided foreigners with the right to vote in
local elections. 31 The court argued that, according to Article 20 of the
Basic Law, all public authority emanates from the people. This provision
requires that the "people," within the context of the Constitution, is com-
prised of all German citizens. The Court explicitly refused the argument
that the factual immigration into Germany changed the constitutional
concept of democracy and the exercise of political rights by the people.
The Constitutional Court recognized that there is a basic democratic re-
quirement of convergence between those possessing political rights and
those persons subject to the exercise of state power. This convergence,
however, is a task for the legislature. By reforming the citizenship law,
the legislature can react to factual changes in the population of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany.
As a reaction to the fact that Germany has become a de facto country
of immigration, there have been increasing demands by political parties
in the Bundestag, particularly by the Liberal Party and the Social Demo-
cratic Party, for an immigration law.32 The basic idea behind such a de-
mand is that the previous political doctrine, whereby Germany is not a
country of immigration, is to be replaced by a comprehensive immigra-
tion policy. Such a policy would set different quotas and create special
categories of immigrants, possibly in combination with an overall limita-
tion of immigration. Another goal of such drafts concerns a policy of
integration for those persons who would receive immigrant status. By
establishing a special immigrant status, immigrants would then be granted
special rights and obligations. They should, therefore, also receive indi-
vidual rights for financial assistance, a special residence permit, and the
right of naturalization.
Enactment of an immigration law that with respect to immigration it-
self is to be regulated by quota, is an illusion. In the best case, a large
bureaucracy will administer quotas which have no practical relevance at
all for factual immigration. In the worst case, the creation of an immi-
30. See, e.g., Josef Isensee, Die staatsrechtliche Stellung der Auslander in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 32 VEROFFENTLICHUNGEN DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHT-
SLEHRER 50, 81 (1974).
31. See generally BVerfGE 83, 60; BverfGE 83, 37 (discussing the Statute of Schleswig-
Holstein).
32. For a discussion of the different legislative proposals, see Kay Hailbronner, Aus
Politik und Zeitgeschichte, BEILAGE zU ADAS PARLAMENT, B 46/97; Das Manifest der 60,
DEUTSCHLAND UND DIE EINWANDERUNG (Klaus J. Bade ed., 1994); EINWANDERUNG-
SLAND BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND IN DER EUROPAISCHEN UNION, SCHRIFT DES IN-
STITUTS FOR MIGRATIONSFORSCHUNG (A. Weber ed., 1997).
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grant status will create substantial attraction and induce economic mi-
grants to move to Germany and apply for an immigrant status. As a
matter of fact, there will be a substantial immigration, with or without
immigration legislation, by way of family reunification, admission of refu-
gees, and freedom of movement within the European Union, particularly
from the newly acceding eastern European states. There is no possibility
whatsoever of preventing or substantially regulating such immigration.
Every serious economic analysis shows that, in the foreseeable future,
there will be no demand for unskilleed labor in a situation of high unem-
ployment in Germany, as well as in almost all western European neigh-
boring states.
It is also questionable whether the goal of better regulation of immigra-
tion may be achieved by utilizing quotas and the establishment of an im-
migrant status. The real reason for such skepticism is that the legal and
political scope of discretion is substantially lower than would be neces-
sary for the effective control and limitation of further economically un-
wanted immigration and not because of EU laws and policy.
Contemporary Germany is in a much different situation than the Ger-
many of forty years ago when a rapidly expanding economy urgently
needed new labor. Immigration control based on economic factors would
have to substantially change the legal and political parameters, restrict-
ing, for instance, family reunification or humanitarian admission of de
facto refugees or the individual constitutional right of asylum seekers.
Proponents of an immigration legislation have indicated that they are
prepared to accept such conclusions. If there is to be more effective con-
trol of immigration, it would have to be precisely determined according
to a point system based on professional qualifications, where categories
of de facto immigrants would be restricted in order to replace such immi-
grants with economically better suited immigrants. Otherwise, every im-
migration legislation would simply remain an illusion, and not be
applicable due to a permanent exhaustion of quotas. The coalition agree-
ment between the Social Democratic Party and the Greens did not ad-
dress the idea of controlling immigration by quotas in spite of previous
legislative proposals and resolutions by the Social Democratic Party.
There is a legitimate interest in giving foreigners immigrating into Ger-
many a perspective guaranteeing their gradual integration into the politi-
cal and social system of Germany. To that extent, Germany's migration
policy lacks rules. It is necessary to provide clear guidelines concerning
the integration policy and to provide a perspective of acquiring equal
rights by the foreign population living permanently in Germany. The cor-
rect way is by changing the citizenship laws as well as facilitating naturali-
zation. Likewise, policies which increase the possibility of improving the
educational level and professional training of foreigners must be imple-
mented to guarantee equal opportunities of these foreigners.
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IV. CITIZENSHIP
Unlike migration, the regulatory competence for citizenship has re-
mained within the sovereignty of member states. The Amsterdam Treaty
has made it clear that the political structure, as well as citizenship, do not
fall within the competence of the European Union. There have been ar-
guments in connection with the recent reform of the citizenship law that a
substantial increase of dual nationals, by introducing a jus soli for chil-
dren of immigrants, may violate the basic principle of community law to
respect the interests of the community and the other member states.33 It
is argued that an increase in the number of German citizens, as a result of
the German citizenship reform, has substantial consequences, such as en-
larging the personal scope of application of the Union treaty by granting
Union citizenship to a substantial number of former third country nation-
als. A closer analysis of the European Court's rulings shows that this
argument is without merit. In Miccheletti,34 the court clearly emphasized
the right of every member state to regulate its own citizenship law and
the obligation of every other member state to recognize such regulations.
Thus, an Italian-Argentine dual national, born in Argentina and living in
Argentina, must be recognized as a Union citizen by Spain. The some-
what casual remark of the Court, that every member state is entitled to
determine its own citizenship "subject to community law" can hardly be
used as an argument against the extension of German citizenship to chil-
dren born in Germany to immigrant parents. Acquisition of nationality
by jus soli has been introduced in a majority of EU member states.35
There is no solid basis for the assumption that community law is implicitly
based on the jus sanguinis principle.
The Basic Law, in Articles 16 and 116, has relatively little to say on the
content of citizenship legislation, except that nobody may be deprived of
German citizenship. The Basic Law, however, makes clear that loss of
citizenship against one's will may only occur pursuant to law and only if
the person affected does not thereby become stateless.
Again, German history has clearly been at the cradle of this provi-
sion.36 The drafting history shows that the clause was intended to prevent
any repetition of legislative or administrative acts, similar to Nazi legisla-
tion depriving Jews of their German citizenship. 37 Applied today in a very
33. See Rupert Scholz & Arnd Uhle, Staatsangehorigkeit und Grundgesetz, 21 NEUE
JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFV 1510, 1514 n.58 (1999).
34. Case C-369/90, Michelettiv Delegaci6n del Gobierro en Cantabria, 1992 E.C.R. I-
4239; see also Andreas Zimmermann, Europaisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und Staat-
sangehorigkeitrecht der Mitgliedstaaton unter Beriksichtigung der Probleme mehrfacher
Staatsangeherigkeit, 30 EUROPARECHT 54 (1995).
35. See F. Sturm, DAS STANDESAMT 225 (1999); GONTER RENNER, ZEITSCHRIFr FOR
AUSLANDERRECHT UND AUSLANDERPOLITIK 49 (1993); Kay Hailbronner, Einbuirgerung
von Wanderarbeitnehmern und doppelte Staatsangehorigkeit, BADEN-BADEN (1992).
36. For a comment on the Basic Law's provision on citizenship, see GONTER RENNER,
ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLANDERRECHT UND AUSLANDERPOLITIK 50 (1993).
37. See generally KAY HAILBRONNER, STAATSANGEHORIGKEITSRECHT: KOMMANTAR
(1998) [hereinafter HAILBRONNER, STAATSANGEHORIGKEITSRECHT].
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different context, the general prohibition of deprivation of German citi-
zenship raises extremely difficult issues of interpretation. There are a
number of different theories on where to draw the line between a consti-
tutionally admissible involuntary loss of German citizenship and the un-
constitutional deprivation of citizenship. The Constitutional Court has
decided that the loss of German citizenship, as a result of an intentional
acquisition of a foreign nationality, is constitutionally admissible. It may
well be confronted with the issue of depriving German citizenship under
the new citizenship law, in connection with those dual nationals who, hav-
ing acquired German citizenship by birth on German territory (jus soli),
cannot show that, by the age of twenty-three, foreign citizenship has been
renounced.
The July 15, 1999 law, reforming the nationality law of 1913, passed by
the Bundestag and Bundesrat,38 with the consent of the Bundesrat, does
not change the basic rule that German nationality is acquired by descent.
As a matter of fact, the principle of acquisition of nationality by descent
is an inherent part of all western European countries as well as the
United States. The major point of reform is that, in the future, children
born in Germany to foreign parents acquire German citizenship by birth,
provided that one parent has been a permanent resident in Germany for
at least eight years and has a permanent residence permit. It follows that
with the acquisition of German nationality by jus soli children of immi-
grants will typically acquire dual citizenship because they will acquire one
or more of the nationalities of their parents. Contrary to a previous draft
of the federal government the current law does not provide for a perma-
nent dual nationality. According to the "option model," dual nationals,
who acquired German nationality by jus soli, must chose between Ger-
many and their foreign nationality when they reach the age of adulthood.
German nationality is lost automatically if a dual national cannot show
the renunciation of their foreign citizenship by the age of twenty-three.
There are exceptions for those persons who may, for legal or factual rea-
sons, not be able to renounce their citizenship, such as when a home state
makes renunciation dependent on unacceptable conditions.
The option can be exercised only by jus soli nationals, while other dual
nationals, such as children of mixed marriages or even children of a jus
soli dual national, do not have to opt. This may lead to somewhat strange
results when the parents lose their German nationality by the age of
twenty-three, while their children never lose their German nationality,
even if they move out of Germany immediately after birth.
The law also provides for substantial facilitations of naturalization.
Foreigners with a secure residence permit have a right to acquire German
citizenship after eight years of residence instead of the fifteen-year wait
period for those without secure resident permits. This right is dependent
upon a sufficient knowledge of the German language and a formal com-
38. BGBI. 11 S. 1618 (1999).
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mitment to respect the Basic Law. The principle to renounce foreign citi-
zenship is maintained although there are various exceptions. A major
exception applies when renunciation of foreign citizenship would result in
serious economic or financial disadvantages. The new law also provides
for a special rule concerning renunciation of foreign citizenship for Union
citizens. Subject to reciprocity, Union citizens may be naturalized with-
out being obliged to give up their former nationality.
The extension of German citizenship to children born on German terri-
tory to foreigners means a substantial conceptual change. For proponents
of the reform legislation, it is a modernization of a historical dimension.
For adversaries, it is a fundamental change endangering the identity of
the German nation. These adversaries see the legislation as a form of
revolution, by which the government selects the people from which it de-
rives its legitimacy, as opposed to the people electing the government. 39
German nationality law is based upon the pre-revolutionary nationality
law of 1914. The general argument in the political debate has been that
German nationality law is antiquated-a relict of an exaggerated nation-
alism. As a matter of fact, German nationality law has been repeatedly
amended not only because of the prohibition of gender-related discrimi-
nation, but also as a consequence of the factual development of Germany
into a country of immigration. The Aliens Law of 1990 and 1992 had
already created rights of naturalization for the first generation of re-
cruited migrant workers as well as for the second generation of immi-
grants born or brought up in Germany.40 The usual identification of
German nationality law with ethnicity is frequently based upon a superfi-
cial knowledge or misunderstanding of German nationality law. The
equation of the German people with ethnical affiliation was introduced
by Nazi legislation depriving Jews of German citizenship. After the Sec-
ond World War, the distinction of the term "German" from the term
"German citizen" has served as an instrument for granting freedom of
movement and fundamental rights to all persons who were expelled be-
cause of their cultural and ethnic affiliation with the German nation.
With the liberalization of immigration laws in the former Soviet Union,
approximately 200,000 "ethnic Germans" and their descendants made use
of that privileged access to German citizenship every year. However,
those numbers have substantially declined, by now, to approximately
100,000 per year.
Additionally, the concept of German citizenship based on descent has
served as an important link for all Germans, whether they were lucky
enough to live in the Federal Republic of Germany or whether they be-
came citizens of the newly established German Democratic Republic,
which was desperately trying to get its nationality law recognized.
39. See RUPERT SCHOLZ & ARND UHLE, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 1510
(1999).




The migration movement, which, since the recruitment period, had
largely changed the composition of the population in Germany, did pro-
duce results in German nationality law well before the reform of 1999. In
1997, approximately 42,000 Turkish nationals were naturalized, a large
part of them being dual nationals. 41 This shows that dual nationality is not
such a fundamental novelty in German citizenship law, as is sometimes
argued.
Nevertheless, the acquisition of German nationality by jus soli will fun-
damentally change the basis of German nationality. One may well argue
under what conditions jus soli can be considered sufficient criteria for
admission to the community of citizens. Traditional immigration societies
like the United States do not have to deal with this question. There is no
alternative to identification with a community almost exclusively founded
and developed by immigrants. In Germany, like in many other western
European countries, the situation is somewhat more complicated. Lan-
guage, culture, and traditional values do play a substantially larger role in
shaping the "identity" of the nation than is the case in a society which has
always been multi-, or should I say, "pluricultural."
It is not only legitimate, but also politically desirable to consider care-
fully the implications of a reform of nationality law for the concept of
"nation." In the German situation it is, however, important to recognize
that the elements determining the identity of a nation, like German lan-
guage, culture, and tradition cannot be interpreted statically. The identity
of the nation can only be maintained if factual changes of the population
are duly taken into account. Identity is also defined by a consensus on
fundamental values and principles on living peacefully together, as laid
down in the Basic Law. Or, to put it differently, exclusion of a substantial
part of the population from the political and implicitly social community
increases the danger of segregation. Only those foreigners who are ac-
cepted in the political community can be expected to act responsibly and
to engage fully in the political and social life of the Federal Republic.
Therefore, constitutional objections based on the concept of nation and
the principle of democracy 42 are unfounded. The Basic Law does not
contain explicit criteria for the regulation of German citizenship law.
This does not mean, however, that the legislature is not subject to certain
constitutional requirements in determining who may acquire German cit-
izenship. From the concept of nation and democracy, as laid down in the
Basic Law, fundamental requirements may be derived for the reform of
German citizenship law. Arguing from a historical perspective of Ger-
man citizenship law that jus soli acquisition of German citizenship is con-
stitutionally prohibited because it does not constitute a part of the
traditional German citizenship law, does, however, amount to an unac-
41. See generally Bericht der Bundesbeauftragten far Ausldnderfragen, DATEN UND
FAKTEN ZUR AUSLANDERSITUATION (1999); DAS STANDESAMT 211 (1999).
42. See, e.g., Scholz, supra note 33, at 1510.
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ceptable petitio principii.43
The concept of the German nation is not fixed by traditional criteria of
citizenship. The Constitutional Court has convincingly stated that the Ba-
sic Law allows the legislature to determine the criteria for acquisition and
loss of German citizenship. By changing the citizenship law, the legisla-
ture may react to changes in the composition of the population of the
Federal Republic of Germany in order to take account of the basic demo-
cratic principle that the population permanently living on German terri-
tory should be able to exercise its political rights.44 One may even argue
that, under the principle of democracy, the legislature must not remain
inactive in the face of a growing gap between those possessing political
rights and those living permanently on German territory. The Constitu-
tional Court, therefore, indicated that rather than extending political
rights to foreigners, German citizenship law may be extended to foreign-
ers who have established permanent residence on German territory and
are, therefore, subject to the state in a similar way as German citizens.45
It follows that a basic constitutional criteria must be that foreigners ac-
quiring German citizenship are subject to the state in a similar way as are
native German citizens. One may derive from this principle further crite-
ria concerning a genuine link to Germany. There can be little doubt,
however, that the granting of German citizenship to persons born on
German territory, provided that their parents have established them-
selves permanently in Germany, does constitute a sufficient link for ac-
quisition of German citizenship. 46
We have to acknowledge that we do not yet know whether the new
nationality legislation will contribute to achieve the goals connected with
the extension of German citizenship. Further we will not know the an-
swer for decades. However, some of our neighboring states in western
Europe have gone similar ways, by granting nationality in extension of
the jus sanguinis principle. 47 Evidence from the experiences in France,
Belgium, and the Netherlands does not indicate that reform of nationality
law has been a complete success. However, it is not altogether discourag-
ing either. The risks of a temporary or permanent dual nationality, with
respect to legal uncertainty, conflict of loyalties, and multiplication of po-
litical rights, have not substantially materialized.
The final test will be whether a reform of nationality law will contribute
to the maintenance of the elements stabilizing the "identity" of the na-
tion. The law would be a fundamental failure if it would lead to the es-
tablishment of national ethnic minorities with privileged political and
social rights. The reform legislation makes clear that together with the
requirement of sufficient German language knowledge and a commit-
43. See id.
44. See BVerfGE 83, 37 (52).
45. See id.
46. See Kay Hailbronner, Neue Zeitschrift fPr Verwaltungsrecht (1999).
47. See Sturm, Das Standesamt 225 (1999); KAY HAILBRONNER, EINBORGERUNG VON
WANDERARBEITNEHMERN UND DOPPELTE STAATSANGEHORIGKEIT (1992).
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ment to the principles of the Basic Law, admission to the political com-
munity is dependent on the intention to integrate into German society.
There are also objections to the reform legislation based on constitu-
tional arguments against the duty to opt. 48 The requirement to opt, from
the age of eighteen to twenty-three, in favor of one of the different na-
tionalities does not violate the constitutional provision against depriva-
tion of German citizenship. The clause must be interpreted on the basis
of German historical experience with the arbitrary deprivation of citizen-
ship. Loss of citizenship related to intentional and voluntary acts to opt
for a permanent affiliation to a foreign state at the age of adulthood can
hardly be equated to acts which the founders of the Basic Law had in
mind when drafting Article 16 of the Basic Law.
V. ASYLUM
The amendment of the Constitution in 1993, providing the basis for the
reform of the asylum law, has been almost as controversial as the reform
of the citizenship law, only with different political proponents and adver-
saries. Following a serious political crisis in 1992, with 438,000 asylum
seekers and more than two-thirds of all asylum seekers registered in the
member states of the European Union, major political parties finally
agreed to change Article 16 by providing for the individual rights of per-
sons who had been persecuted for political reasons to enjoy asylum in
the Federal Republic of Germany.49 Whereas Article 16(a)(1) of the Ba-
sic Law still provides for an individual right to enjoy asylum in Germany,
Article 16(a)(2) incorporates the concepts of "safe third country" and
"safe country of origin" in the constitution. Since all EU member states
and countries neighboring Germany are deemed safe third countries, the
constitutional right of asylum in principle is no longer applicable to refu-
gees who come to Germany by land. According to Article 16(a)(3), the
list of safe countries of origin must be approved by Parliament. The
amendment of the Constitution and its subsequent restriction of the right
of asylum has been confirmed in all essential parts by three Federal Con-
stitutional Court decisions of May 14, 1996.50
Simultaneously, the law of asylum procedure was subsequently
amended, providing for a detailed regulation on the right of asylum.
Under the new provisions, both the request for recognition as a victim of
persecution and the need for protection against deportation to a state in
which the refugee is facing persecution are taken into consideration when
an asylum application is processed. In addition, a new status was intro-
duced for persons fleeing war and civil war situations. This status for civil
war refugees has only recently been applied with regard to Kosovo-Al-
banians because the federal government and the Ldnder have not been
48. See, e.g., Scholz, supra note 33.
49. Kay Hailbronner, Current Asylum Issues in Germany, 4.6 UCL, Center for Ger-
man and European Studies (Aug. 1995).
50. Vol. 94, 49, 115, 166; Frowein/Zimmermann, 1996, 753.
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able to agree on the payment of housing and welfare costs for those
granted temporary protection. The law also provides for the possibility of
ordering a temporary deportation waiver for groups of people staying
within the country, either based on a reason of public international law or
on humanitarian grounds. To extend the validity of the deportation
waiver, the agreement of the Federal Ministry of the Interior must be
obtained.
Finally, according to Section 53 of the Aliens Act, the federal office for
the recognition of foreign refugees must examine whether the applicant is
facing a risk of torture, death penalty, or any violation of the rights laid
down in the European Convention on Human Rights. If the risk of being
returned to his or her country of origin exists, an asylum seeker is granted
a tolerated residence by the aliens office.
The law on asylum procedure has also introduced a special accelerated
procedure for airport cases, which is used for asylum seekers coming
from safe countries of origin or those without valid passports. In such
cases, applicants awaiting a decision on entry into the territory must re-
main at the airport. A decision on entry must be reached within two days
or the applicant will automatically be allowed to enter the territory. If
the claim is rejected as manifestly unfounded, entry is refused. The appli-
cant may, however, file an appeal with an administrative court within the
next three days with suspensive effect. If the administrative court does
not reach a decision within fourteen days, the applicant is allowed to
enter the country.
Based on the amendment of the constitutional law, the Asylum Proce-
dure Act also provides for a substantial reduction of judicial remedies
and court injunctions. Asylum seekers arriving from safe third countries
cannot challenge in court the safety of a safe third country. In addition,
according to paragraph 4 of Article 16 a of the Basic Law the implemen-
tation of measures terminating a persons sojourn in case of a manifestly
improper asylum application may be suspended by a court only when se-
rious doubts exist as to the legality of the measures.
The constitutional amendment depriving asylum seekers arriving from
"safe third countries" has been criticized heavily as a factual abolishment
of the individual right of asylum granted in Article 16, Section 1. Since
Germany is surrounded by safe third countries, no asylum seeker could
theoretically reach Germany claiming access to the asylum procedure ex-
cept by air or sea or parachuting from an airplane. Nevertheless, approx-
imately one hundred thousand asylum seekers are registered every year
in Germany due to the fact that, in most cases, the safe third country
clause cannot be applied since the safe third country, through which an
asylum seeker has arrived, cannot be properly identified. Asylum seekers
usually destroy all documents indicating their travel route and will argue
that they have no precise knowledge how they got into Germany. In such
cases return is impossible due to the lack of a country which would be
willing to accept an asylum seeker. It may be easier to grant access to the
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asylum procedure in such cases rather than referring the asylum seeker to
the legal status of a tolerated person.
For basically the same reasons, the internal EU systems 51 for attribut-
ing one EU country's exclusive responsibility for processing asylum seek-
ers (Dublin Agreement) have not functioned satisfactorily. Within the
EU system, however, there are clear rules as to which state is exclusively
responsible (primarily the state which has issued a visa or a residence
permit; lacking a residence permit or visa, it is the state of first entry).
The Dublin Agreement frequently cannot be applied due to the lack of
willingness of asylum seekers to identify their travel route. The situation
may eventually change once the somewhat exaggerated requirements
concerning proof of an asylum seeker's nationality and his or her travel
route are facilitated and bureaucratic barriers overcome.
The most essential step in the direction of a system of exclusive compe-
tence, however, will be the introduction of a European data system, laid
down in the Eurodac Draft Convention. Once a Eurodac Regulation 52 is
in operation, every EU member state will be obliged to register every
foreigner claiming asylum and other foreigners to be found illegally in the
country. On the basis of an easily accessible fingerprint identification sys-
tem, it would be possible, within a very short time, to find out whether a
foreign person claiming asylum has been registered elsewhere for an asy-
lum application, regardless of any travel documents or statements con-
cerning the travel route. It will, however, take a long time until such a
system can be fully operative, particularly since those states that are geo-
graphically close to countries of origin of asylum seekers will not be par-
ticularly interested in ensuring the efficient functioning of such a system.
A more fundamental objection, however, to the safe third country con-
cept is that it challenges, to some extent, the idea underlying traditional
refugee law-that everybody who has somehow managed to get to a safe
country will have access to the asylum procedure. 53 The safe third coun-
try concept defers the responsibility for dealing with the refugee problem
to those European countries bordering crisis areas. With the enlargement
of the European Union, this will include Poland, Hungary, and the Slovak
and Czech Republics. It is frequently argued that these countries are not
able to cope with large numbers of refugees.
The political objections raised against the safe third country concept
make clear that a European and even an international regime of coping
with refugee movements is needed. It is obvious, that in the long run, no
viable solution can be found in simply deferring responsibility. This
clearly calls for the establishment of a European system of distributing
51. For a description of the Dublin system, see Kay Hailbronner & Claus Thiery, 34
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 957 (1997).
52. See Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) concerning the establishment of
"Eurodac" for the comparison of the fingerprints of applicants for asylum and certain
other aliens, COM (99)260 final, CNS 99/0116.
53. For a discussion of the safe third country concept see Hailbronner, Immigration
Control, in 4 BERGHAHN 199 (Hailbronner/Martin/Motomura eds., 1998).
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burdens and attributing responsibility for processing refugees. On the
other hand, the idea underlying the Geneva Convention of 1951, which
has been upheld for many decades, until the collapse of the Soviet Union,
whereby protection may be found in far distant regions, cannot be main-
tained anymore. The situation of Kosovo Albanians shows that, even in a
situation of ethnic cleansing and massive violations of human rights, the
solution cannot be permanent admission of large numbers of refugees.
Only temporary protection, primarily in the region, should be granted to
prevent the expulsion and resettlement of large populations. On the
other hand, some of the ideas underlying the Geneva Convention and,
particularly, the distinction between individual political persecution and a
general situation of massive human rights violations, do not sufficiently
reflect the realities of today's migration movements.
The individual right of asylum, granted by the Basic Law and main-
tained even in the recent constitutional amendment of 1993, has gener-
ated substantial restrictions to such an extent that one may argue that
Article 16, Section 1 amounts to hypocrisy. It would have been wise in-
deed not to disguise the fact that an individual right of asylum in Ger-
many, as in most other western European countries, can no longer be
maintained, even if it is assumed that only a relatively small percentage of
asylum seekers are indeed fulfilling the criteria required for recognition
as political refugees. As a constitutional individual right, every foreigner
should obtain, from the individual right of asylum, at least a claim to ac-
cess to an asylum procedure, a temporary residence permit, and possibly
a judicial remedy in case of a refusal of an application. It is doubtful that
this system will survive much longer. It has already suffered substantial
erosion by the referral to alternative protection in a safe third country. It
will eventually be replaced by a European system of monitoring; granting
temporary protection; military and political intervention, in case mass ref-
ugee movements are generated; and, finally, burden sharing for those
who will not be able to return. One of the prominent clauses of the Basic
Law the right of political asylum, will eventually become obsolete. It has
already been replaced, to a large extent, by other concepts. It would have
been more convincing had Bundestag decided to abolish the concept of
an individual right of asylum and replaced it by a general commitment to
a European international regime of granting refugee protection, thereby
leaving it to the legislature to enact the necessary laws and regulations.
The historical commitment of Germany to the idea of protection against
totalitarian regimes could thus have been upheld in a modified way and
adapted to the reality and rules of today's world. This does not mean
disrespect for the founders of the Basic Law.
The Basic Law, although undoubtedly one of the most impressive polit-
ical achievements in modern German history, is man-made and, like any
other human product, is subject to a change of circumstances. To recog-
nize the need for constitutional reform is to recognize that a requirement
20001
SMU LAW REVIEW
for maintaining the spirit and basic humanitarian content of the Basic
Law, after fifty years of its existence, is indispensable.
ANNEX:
The following table shows the share of foreigners in the population of
the EU States, as well as in Norway and Switzerland in 1992:
State Overall population of those foreigners %
EU countries
Belgium 10,068,300 909,200 9.0
Germany 80,974,600 6,495,800 8.0
Denmark 5,180,600 180,100 3.5
France 56,652,000 3,596,600 6.3*
Greece 10,350,300 200,300 1.9
Great Britain 57,221,900 2,019,700 3.5*
Ireland 3,563,300 89,900 2.5
Italy 56,950,300 913,600 1.6
Luxemburg 400,600 128,600 32.1
Netherlands 15,239,200 757,400 5.0
Portugal 9,864,600 121,600 1.2
Spain 39,048,000 393,100 1.0
Austria 7,795,800 517,700 6.6
Finland 5,055,000 46,300 0.9
Sweden 8,692,000 495,900 5.7
further information:
Switzerland 6,908,000 1,243,600 18.0
Norway 4,299,200 154,000 3.6
* It has to be taken into account that in France and Great Britain there are in addition a
great number of persons having domestic resident status who have immigrated from the
former colonies.
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The number of foreigners, broken
developed as follows:
down by nationality, has recently
Nationality 30.9.1978 31.12.1982 31.12.1993
% % 1000 %
Total 3,981,100 100 6,495,500 100 6,878,100 100
Europe 3,642,300 89.5 5,361,900 82.5 5,678,400 82.6
EU States 1,444,100 36.3 1,507,300 23.2 1,535,600 22.3
of those:
France 61,200 1.5 90,900 1.4 94,200 1.4
Greece 305,500 1.7 345,900 5.3 352,000 5.1
Great Britain and 67,000 1.7 107,100 1.6 111,700 1.6
Northern Ireland
Italy 572,500 14.3 557,700 8.5 563,000 8.2
Netherlands 105,600 2.7 113,600 1.7 113,900 1.7
Portugal 109,900 2.8 96,900 1.5 105,600 1.5
Spain 188,900 4.7 133,800 2.1 133,200 1.9
Austria 159,300 4.0 185,300 2.9 186,300 2.7
Turkey 1,165,100 29.3 1,854,900 28.6 1,918,400 27.9
Poland 48,000 1.2 285,600 4.4 260,500 3.8
former Yugoslavia 810,200 15.3 1,026,200 15.8 1,238,900 18.0
of those:
Fed. Rep. of
Yugoslavia ** 915,600 14.1 929,600 13.5
Bosnia-Herzegowina ** 19,900 0.3 139,100 2.0
Croatia ** 82,500 1.3 153,100 2.2
Slovenia ** 8.1 0.1 14,400 0.2
Macedonia ** ** 2,600 0.1
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Nationality 31.1.2.1994 31.12.1995 31.12.1996
Total 6,990,500 100 7,173,800 100 7,314,000 100
Europe 5,780,200 82.7 5,917,100 82.5 6,000,800 82.1
EU States 1,554,600 22.4 1,808,400 25.5 1,836,600 25.1
of those:
France 97,000 1.4 99,100 1.4 101,700 1.4
Greece 355,600 5.1 359,600 5.0 362,500 5.0
Great Britain and 113,800 1.6 112,500 1.6 113,400 1.6
Northern Ireland
Italy 571,900 8.2 586,100 8.2 599,400 8.2
Netherlands 112,900 1.6 113,100 1.6 113,300 1.6
Portugal 117,500 1.7 125,100 1.7 130,800 1.8
Spain 132,400 1.9 132,300 1.8 132,500 1.8
Austria 185,100 2.6 184,500 2.6 184,500 2.6
Turkey 1,965,600 28.1 2,014,300 28.1 2,014,300 28.1
Poland 263,400 3.8 276,800 3.9 276,800 3.9
former Yugoslavia 1.,98,000 18.6 1,350,200 18.8 1,353,300 18.5
of those:
Fed. Rep. of
Yugoslavia 834,800 11.9 797,600 11.1 754,300 10.3
Bosnia-Herzegowina 249,400 3.8 316,000 4.4 340,500 4.7
Croatia 176,300 2.5 185,100 2.6 202,000 2.8
Slovenia 16,200 0.2 17,300 0.2 17,800 0.2
Macedonia 22,300 0.3 34,000 0.5 38,800 0.5
[Vol. 53
MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND ASYLUM
Nationality 30.9.1978 31.12.1982 31.12.1992
Africa 79,500 2.0 283,900 4.4 302,100 4.4
of those:
Morocco 28,900 0.7 80,300 1.2 82,800 1.2
Tunisia 19,200 0.5 28,100 0.4 28,100 0.4
America 102,700 2.6 168,800 2.6 176,500 2.6
of those:
Brazil 4,800 0.1 13,300 0.2 14,600 0.2
United States 71,600 1.8 104,400 1.6 107,800 1.6
Asia 147,200 3.7 598,800 9.2 644,600 9.4
of those:
Afghanistan 1,900 0.0 41,500 0.8 46,500 0.7
Iran 19,500 0.5 99,100 1.5 101,500 1.5
Japan 12,200 0.3 26,500 0.4 27,100 0.4
Lebanon 6,800 0.2 53,500 0.8 55,100 0.8
Pakistan 17,900 0.4 32,300 0.6 34,400 0.5
Sri Lanka 1,200 0.0 43,900 0.7 46,500 0.7
Viet Nam 2,700 0.1 85,700 1.3 95,500 1.4
Australia and Oceania 6,100 0.2 8,400 0.1 8,800 0.1
Stateless 30,100 0.8 21,900 0.3 20,900 0.3
Unclear, no
information 47,800 1.2 54,100 0.8 45,900 0.7
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Nationality 31.12.1994 31.1.2.1995 31.12.1996
Africa 292,100 4.2 291,200 4.1 298,700 4.1
of those:
Morocco 82,400 1.2 81,900 1.1 82,900 1.1
Tunisia 27,400 0.4 26,400 0.4 25,700 0.4
America 179,700 2.6 183,100 2.6 189,500 2.6
of those:
Brazil 15,700 0.2 16,800 0.2 1.8,400 0.3
United States 1.08,300 1.5 108,400 1.5 109,600 1.5
Asia 662,400 9.5 705,400 9.8 745,800 10.2
of those:
Afghanistan 51,400 0.7 58,500 0.8 63,100 0.98
Iran 104,100 1.5 107,000 1.5 111,100 1.5
Japan 27,100 0.4 27,300 0.4 28,100 0.4
Lebanon 54,300 0.6 54,800 0.8 55,600 0.5
Pakistan 34,500 0.5 36,900 0.5 37,900 0.5
Sri Lanka 49,400 0.7 54,600 0.5 58,300 0.8
Viet Nam 96,700 1.4 96,000 1.3 92,300 1.3
Australia and Oceania 8,900 0.1 9,900 0.1 10,100 0.1
Stateless 20,100 0.3 19,900 0.3 18,600 0.3
Unclear, no
information 47,200 0.7 48,000 0.7 50,400 0.7
** No information
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